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helpful feedback on earlier drafts. Any remaining flaws are due to the limitations of my
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“Thus my language is the sum total of myself; for
the man is the thought.” (CP 5.314)
“Quintus Ennius tria corda habere sese dicebat,
quod loqui Graece et Osce et Latine scire.”
[“Quintus Ennius said of himself he had three
hearts, because he knew how to speak Greek,




1 Charles  Peirce,  a  thinker  greatly  interested  in  classification,  presents  a  problem  of
classification himself. That is, the breadth of his philosophical interests, commitment to
an  ethics  of  terminology,  deep  engagement  with  the  history  of  philosophy,  and
experimentalist  temperament,  can make it  difficult  to  determine  which positions  he
actually  held,  and  at  which  times.  Famously,  he  re-christened  his  pragmatism
‘pragmaticism’ to make it safe from kidnappers, but perhaps less generally known is his
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characterization of his thought as a ‘Critical Common-sensism’ – an effort to mediate or
moderate the Kantian and Reidian reactions to Hume.1 Peirce offers two overlapping sets
of  marks  distinguishing  his  Critical  Common-sensism,  mostly  directed  against  the
Common Sense School. However, there is an element of Reid’s Philosophy of Common
Sense  that  Peirce,  and  most  other  commentators,  neglect:  his  appeals  to  universal
grammatical  features  as  evidence for  common sense  beliefs concerning cognition.  In
other contexts, though, Peirce is as critical of appeals to language as he is of appeals to
psychology. Thus, Peirce’s rejection of what may be called linguisticism,  as part of his
rejection of  psychologism,  serves  as  an additional  distinguishing mark of  his  Critical
Common-sensism.2
2 In what follows I will briefly discuss Peirce’s Critical Common-sensism, and then turn to
Reid’s use of language as a key form of evidence for his account of Common Sense. Then, I
will  review Peirce’s  consistent critique of  the ‘Procrustean bed of  Latin grammar’;  in
particular,  how  philosophers  have  limited  their  study  to  a  small,  and  in  Peirce’s
assessment ‘peculiar,’ set of world languages. This Procrustean Bed has constrained how
speakers of European languages have thought about logical topics, especially the nature
of propositions, and the tendency to force other grammars to fit into Latin categories has
hidden  the  diversity  of  language.  Furthermore,  Peirce  often  suggests  some  form  of
linguistic determinism or relativity; at minimum, that language conditions thought. Thus,
while  philosophy  is  independent  of  linguistics  for  Peirce,  it  is  not  independent  of
language, and the question remains what is left of common sense once we appreciate how
different languages can be.
 
Peirce’s Characters of Critical Common-Sensism
3 Peirce’s 1905 “What Pragmatism Is” opens with both a restatement of how ‘pragmatism’
grew out  of  his  own  experiences  as  an  experimental  scientist  and  an  appeal  that
philosophers adopt an ethics of terminology:
[…]  the  general  feeling  shall  be  that  he  who introduces  a  new conception  into
philosophy is under an obligation to invent acceptable terms to express it, and that
when he has done so, the duty of his fellow-students is to accept those terms, and to
resent  any  wresting  of  them from their  original  meanings,  as  not  only  a  gross
discourtesy to him to whom philosophy was indebted for each conception, but also
as an injury to philosophy itself.3
4 This general feeling, plus the suggestion to use -ci as an infix indicating a more specific
form of a doctrine, gives birth to ‘pragmaticism’ as a doctrine related to, yet distinct
from, those of William James and Ferdinand Schiller, and even more distinct from its
abuse by the literary. What makes pragmaticism more specific? It both limits itself to a
maxim for determining the meaning of a concept, which Peirce believes provides a better
possibility of developing a critical proof, and connects to at least two other doctrines:
Critical Common-sensism and Scholastic Realism. 
5 In  the  next  article  of  the  series,  “Issues  of  Pragmaticism,”  Peirce  asserts  these  two
doctrines “[…] were defended by the writer about nine years before the formulation of
pragmaticism [but] may be treated as consequences of the latter belief.”4 He then offers
six distinguishing characters:
Character I: “Critical Common-sensism admits that there not only are indubitable
propositions but also that there are indubitable inferences.”5
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Character II: A list of indubitable propositions could be drawn up, with only slight
changes from generation to generation.6
Character  III:  “[…]  one  thing  the  Scotch failed  to  recognize  is  that  the  original
beliefs only remain indubitable in their application to affairs that resemble those of
a primitive mode of life.”7
Character IV: Acritically indubitable beliefs are invariably vague.8
Character V: These indubitable beliefs must be subject to rigorous examination, and
even after be regarded as fallible.
Character VI: “Critical Common-sensism may fairly lay claim to this title for two
sorts of reasons; namely, that on the one hand it subjects four opinions to rigid
criticism: its own; that of the Scotch school; that of those who would base logic or
metaphysics on psychology or any other special science, the least tenable of all the
philosophical opinions that have any vogue; and that of Kant; while on the other
hand it has besides some claim to be called Critical from the fact that it is but a
modification of Kantism.”9
6 Peirce must offer these modifications both to represent his own position and to allay the
fears of critics convinced that these two doctrines, “[…] the two rival and opposed ways of
answering Hume, are at internecine war, impacificable.”10 At this point, it may seem that
Critical Common-sensism is more distinct from the Philosophy of Common Sense than
Kant’s Critical Philosophy, but Peirce offers a potentially severe caveat: “The Kantist has
only to abjure from the bottom of his heart the proposition that a thing-in-itself can,
however  indirectly,  be  conceived;  and  then  correct  the  details  of  Kant’s  doctrine
accordingly, and he will find himself to have become a Critical Common-sensist.”11 That
is,  removing the ding-an-sich from Kant’s  project  might demand a complete overhaul
rather than a tidying up of details.12 
7 This focus on Reid is due, in part, to Peirce’s own shifting preferences.13 In 1864 he wrote
that “I hold the Doctrine of Common Sense to be well fitted to Reid’s philosophical caliber
and about as effective against any of the honored systems of philosophy as a potato-pop-
gun’s contents might be against Gibraltar.”14 Five years later he added “Scotch school of
philosophy […] is too old a tree to bear good fruit.”15 However, by 1905 Peirce had revised
his assessment and held Reid to be a “subtle but well-balanced intellect […] in the matter
of Common Sense.”16 While subtle and well-balanced, Reid lacked Peirce’s logical skill,
especially  concerning  the  logic  of  relatives  and  the  logic  of  vagueness,  and  an
appreciation for evolution. Our original beliefs, and acritical inferences, are of the nature
of instincts; in particular, instincts developed in ‘primitive modes’ of life. This should not
be  taken  to  mean  only  the  plains  of  Africa,  as  in  simplistic  forms  of  evolutionary
psychology, as Peirce notes that some of our common sense beliefs “of such a character
that they can hardly have entered the minds, say, of Neanderthal men”17 Peirce suggests
these ‘primitive’ ways of life are simply our everyday embodied world of “moderate-sized
specimens  of  dry  goods.”18 However,  “[m]odern  science,  with  its  microscopes  and
telescopes, […] has put us into quite another world […]” and this new world surpasses the
adequacy of our common sense beliefs, at least without just criticism.19 Thus, we risk
illegitimately importing the practical certainty of our common sense beliefs into domains
where they are ill-suited. Furthermore, Reid perhaps overestimates the reliability of our
common sense beliefs even within their proper domain, because of his commitment to a
form  of  Providential  Naturalism.20 After  Darwin,  though,  we  are  on  safer  ground
considering people adequately  endowed by evolution,  rather than well-endowed by our
Creator.
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8 In short, Peirce considered Reid’s Philosophy of Common Sense insufficiently fallibilist, in
large part  due to  coming before  intellectual  and scientific  developments  with which
Peirce  was  intimately  familiar.21 However,  there  is  another  element  of  Reid’s
characterization and defense of Common Sense of which Peirce could have been more
critical: his appeals to language.
 
Reid’s Common Sense as Grammatical Universals
9 As suggested above, Peirce’s pragmaticism deserves the specifying infix in part because it
is not a doctrine of metaphysics – “It is merely a method of ascertaining the meanings of
hard  words  and  of  abstract  concepts.”22 Furthermore,  Peirce  advocates  an  ethics  of
terminology modeled on the taxonomic sciences because he sees this as one key to their
successful advancement. Reid believes this as well: “There is no greater impediment to
the advancement of knowledge than the ambiguity of words. To this chiefly it is owing that
we find sects and parties in most branches of science, and disputes which are carried on
from  age  to  age,  without  being  brought  to  an  issue.”23 Reid  considers  philosophers
especially prone to this error, as they create ambiguity through using common sense
words in uncommon senses:
But if [a philosopher] puts a different meaning upon a word, without observing it
himself, or giving warning to others; he abuses language, and disgraces philosophy,
without doing service to truth: as if a man should exchange the meaning of the
words daughter and cow, and then endeavor to prove to his plain neighbor, that is
cow is his daughter, and his daughter his cow.24
10 This care for language is an important element of Reid’s critique of the “way of ideas” as a
philosophy contrary to Common Sense. For example, “Perhaps it was unfortunate for Mr
Locke that he used the word idea so very frequently as to make it very difficult to give the
attention necessary to put it always to the same meaning.”25 In particular, while Locke
does note that he includes phantasm, notion, and species under idea, on Reid’s view he fails
to note that this equivocation collapses common sense distinctions between the activity
of  thought  and its  external  objects  under the philosophical  conception of  idea as  an
immediate or internal object. This Lockean legerdemain culminates in Hume’s contention
that there is nothing but ideas (perceptions distinguished into impressions and ideas only
by their own force and vivacity). Again, for Reid this violates the common sense belief
that thinkers are distinct from the activity of thought, and both are distinct from the
external objects of thought. 
11 However, what interests us here is one of the forms of evidence to which Reid appeals –
not only is this tripartite distinction an instinctive common sense belief, but also “It is
impossible to trace the origin of this opinion in history: for all languages it interwoven in
their  original  construction.”26 That  is,  we  know  this  to  be  a  universal  judgment  of
humanity because it is represented in all languages.27 This claim is from Reid’s Inquiry, but
he expands upon it in his Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man:
In all ages, and in all languages, ancient and modern, the various modes of thinking
have  been  expressed  by  words  of  active  signification,  such  as  seeing,  hearing,
reasoning, willing, and the like. It seems, therefore, to be the natural judgment of
mankind that the mind is active in its various ways of thinking; and for this reason
they are called its operations, and are expressed by active verbs.28
12 Furthermore:
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Such operations are, in all languages, expressed by active transitive verbs; and we
know that,  in  all  languages,  such verbs require a  thing or person,  which is  the
agent, and a noun following in an oblique case, which is the object. Whence it is
evident that all mankind, both those who have contrived language, and those who
use it with understanding, have distinguished these three things as different, – to
wit, the operations of the mind, which are expressed by active verbs, the mind itself,
which is the nominative to those verbs, and the object, which is, in the oblique case,
governed by them.29
13 Again, Reid finds definitive evidence against the ‘way of ideas’ not only in his version of
phenomenology, or in instinctive beliefs, but in the grammar of “all languages.” Thus,
Locke and other modern philosophers violate common sense both in their use of words in
some philosophical meaning rather than their common sense one, with inevitable tacit
sliding across these meanings,  but  also cause confusion by using these words within
grammars that presuppose common sense distinctions among act, agent, and patient. 
14 One more example: “There are philosophers who maintain […] that a body is nothing but
a collection of what we call sensible qualities; and that they neither have nor need any subject
.”30 Here Reid’s directly targets Bishop Berkeley and Mr. Hume, and characteristically he
rejects their belief “that there should be extension without any thing extended” as an
absurdity contrary to a self-evident dictate of his nature.31 However, Reid is not arguing
for a some subjective idealism here, as Berkeley would at least accept that these sensible
qualities require a perceiving subject. Instead, the ‘subject’ needed is a grammatical one,
corresponding to an external object:
And that it is the belief of all mankind appears in the structures of all languages;
which we find adjective nouns used to express sensible qualities. It is well known
that  every adjective  in  language must  belong to  some substantive  expressed or
understood; that is, every quality must belong to some subject.32
15 Furthermore,  Reid  contends  that  if  ascribing  sensible  qualities  to  subjects  were  a
prejudice, and not an innate principle of our nature, we should see not only individual
variation in this belief, but also variations across ages and nations: “[…] but we find no
such difference among men. What one man accounts a quality, all men do, and ever did.”
33 Perhaps Reid is overstating his case here, for Berkeley and Hume do deny this ‘self-
evident’ principle. More generally, Reid acknowledges abnormal variations (‘lunacy’) in
belief, but considers these disorders irrelevant to the overall reliability of our senses and
common sense judgments.34 In the more polemical voice of his Inquiry, Reid even sides
with the vulgar against those philosophers who deny an external world: “[…] too much
learning is apt to make men mad; and that the man who seriously entertains this belief,
though in other respects he may be a very good man, as a man may be who believes that
he is made of glass; yet surely he hath a soft place in his understanding, and hath been
hurt by much thinking.”35 Of course, we do not have to go so far, and even Reid notes
approvingly  that  Hume  backs  away  from  from  such  skeptical  conclusions.36 While
Berkeley and Hume are not on par with a man who believes he is made of glass, they do
misuse language.
16 Reid’s commitment to language is strong enough that he makes it one of his fundamental
methodological principles. The chief source of knowledge about mind is introspective or
phenomenological – “accurate” or “attentive” reflection,  in Reid’s parlance.  However,
there are two subsidiary sources of knowledge: “attention to the structure of language” and
“a  due  attention  to  the  course  of  human  actions  and  opinions.”37 Commentators  on  Reid
typically focus on his distinction between acquired and natural language, the latter being
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a universally comprehensible set of natural signs (facial expressions, gestures, and vocal
tones), to the neglect of his appeals to universal grammatical features.38 Reid is clear that
this is a fallible source of knowledge regarding the human mind, given the variations in
languages, “[b]ut whatever we find common to all languages must have a common cause;
must  be  owing to  some  common notion  or  sentiment  of  the  human mind.”39 Finally,  this
principle returns in the essay on Judgment as part of the third means of determining
what is a First Principle:
There are other opinions that appear to be universal, from what is common in the
structure of all  languages.  Language is the express image and picture of human
thoughts; and from the picture we may draw some certain conclusions concerning
the original.  We find in all  languages the same parts  of  speech;  we find nouns,
substantive  and  adjective;  verbs,  active  and  passive,  in  their  various  tenses,
numbers, and moods. Some rules of syntax are the same in all languages.40
17 Unfortunately, Reid provides no particular examples of these cross-linguistic universals,
in the sense of actual comparative linguistics. Furthermore, I have found no indication
that  Reid  was  familiar  with  languages  beyond  Scots,  English,  and  the  philosophical
quartet  of  French,  German,  Greek,  and  Latin.  This  is  unsurprising,  as  in  Reid’s  day
linguistics was just developing as its own field, and philology remained largely devoted to
Biblical and Classical texts.  In contrast,  Peirce was an accomplished, though amateur,
linguist, who studied non-Indo-European languages ranging from Arabic to Tagalog.41 His
linguistic pursuits led Peirce to a different conclusion regarding the value of linguistics
for philosophy, as we shall now see.
 
Peirce and Linguistics
18 Articulating Peirce’s  conception of  common sense,  and thereby his  Critical  Common-
sensism, requires understanding his rejection of psychologism, the notion that logic rests
upon psychology. We may first distinguish between two forms of psychologism: the first
concerns  grounding logic  (solely)  upon psychological  facts,  and the  second concerns
grounding  logic  upon  psychological  results;  i.e.,  psychology  as  a  special  science.
Regarding the former, Peirce’s illustrative target is Christoph Sigwart, who “says that the
question of what is good logic and what bad must be in the last resort come down to the
question of how we feel: it is a matter of Gefühl, that is, a Quality of Feeling.”42 Peirce
consistently lambasts the “German logicians,” again, of which Sigwart is a key example,
for reducing logical necessity to a psychological compulsion. While this is not the place to
examine Peirce’s arguments against this view, it is important to note his characterization
of the forces with which he aligns himself:
In reasoning, however, your opinion [student of logic] is that we have the singular
phenomenon of a physiological function which is open to approval and disapproval.
In this you are supported by universal common sense, by the traditional logic, and
by  English  logicians  as  a  body.  But  you  are  in  opposition  to  German  logicians
generally, who seldom notice fallacy, conceiving human reason to be an ultimate
tribunal which cannot err.43
19 There is no particular reason to think Peirce is appealing to Reid here, but in Reidian style
he  contends  the  German tendency  to  reduce  logicality  to  feeling  violates  “universal
common sense.” 
20 The first  form of  psychologism thoroughly subjectivizes logic by reducing validity to
feeling, while maintaining a veneer of objective necessity by allowing no tribunal other
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than feeling. The second form of psychologism also threatens logic’s autonomy by basing
it  upon  the  scientific  results  of  psychology,  in  violation  of  Peirce’s  principles  of
classification.44 For Peirce,  both German (e.g.,  Wolff)  and English (e.g.,  Mill)  logicians
make the error of reducing logic to psychology, an error which confounds how we ought
to reason with how we must reason, or at least with how an immature science thinks we
must  reason.45 These  elements  of  Peirce’s  anti-psychologism  are  well  known. 46 Less
remarked upon,  however,  is  his  rejection of  what  may be  called linguisticism,  or  the
tendency to base logic upon linguistics.47 Again, this is a mistake made by Sigwart, “who
holds that logical questions must ultimately be decided by immediate feeling, and that
the usages of the German language are the best evidence of what that feeling is.”48 As
Peirce notes, this appeal to language causes several problems, starting at the level of
vocabulary: “The difficulty of the, at best, difficult problem of the essential nature of a
Proposition has been increased, for the Germans, by their Urtheil, confounding, under one
designation,  the  mental  assertion  with  the  assertible.”49 In  other  words,  this  term
confounds the psychological act of judgment with the logical nature of a proposition,
which may be asserted – judged to be true – or not. In Peirce’s estimation, English, though
a “pirate-lingo” deficient in some areas compared to French and German, provides more
accurate terminology because it maintains distinctions drawn from the Scholastics even
in common speech.50 However,  the  particular  strengths  of  English can be  diluted by
translations based upon similar spellings rather than similar meanings.51 Confusing the
form of a word with its content can even happen within the same language, especially
over time: “[…] modern readers forget that two or three centuries ago words still familiar
suggested  quite  different  ideas  from  those  the  same  words  now  suggest.”52 Again,
clarifying the meaning of words so as to ensure proper use is one of Peirce’s abiding
concerns, as seen in his ethics of terminology and the pragmatic maxim itself. Indeed,
since Peirce adopts a dialogic view of the self, attention to language is not only important
for communication with others, but also for communicating with ourselves: “[…] so it is
wrong to say that a good language is important to good thought, merely; for it is of the
essence of it.”53
21 Thus far, Peirce has much in common with Reid. That is, both criticize other philosophers
for insufficient attention to terminology, thereby causing confusion in at least two ways:
1) Putting idiosyncratic meanings on common words, whether explicitly or not.54
2) Neglecting changes or differences in meanings across languages or over time due to
similar spellings, as when Locke blends the Platonic ἰδέᾱ , Cartesian idée, and English idea.
55
22 These  semantic  confusions  are  compounded  by  the  use  of  common expressions  and
metaphors, as when ideas are in our mind, though minds are supposedly nothing more
than a bundle of perceptions. Likewise, how can ideas present themselves before us when
they are passive copies of impressions? For Reid, the near-impossibility of discussing the
mind without using subjects, actions, and objects, even by those committed to collapsing
these  distinctions,  supports  Common  Sense  over  philosophy.  Finally,  Peirce  was  not
immune to Reidian appeals to linguistic universals, such as the following:
1) All languages have (largely) replaced mimicry with conventional auditory signs.56
2) All languages must have proper nouns and pronouns.57
3) All languages use a metaphor of ‘inclusion’ to express logical entailment.58
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4) All languages make cardinals the fundamental numbers: “Any person whose head is
not cracked by too much study of logic will say without hesitation that the cardinals are
the original numbers. It is common-sense, and common-sense is the safest guide.”59
23 Nonetheless, even if common-sense is the safest guide, overall Peirce was as skeptical of
appealing  to  language  to  sort  out  philosophical  issues  as  he  was  of  appealing  to
psychology:
Appeals to the usages of language are extremely common. They are made even by
those who use algebraical notation in logic “in order to free the mind from the
trammels of  speech” (Schröder,  Logik,  i.  p.  iii).  It  is  difficult  to see what can be
hoped  for  from  such  a  proceeding,  unless  it  be  to  establish  a  psychological
proposition valid for all minds. But to do this, it would be necessary to look beyond
the  small  and  very  peculiar  class  of  Aryan  languages,  to  which  the  linguistic
knowledge of most of those writers is confined. The Semitic languages, with which
some of them are acquainted, are too similar to the Aryan greatly to enlarge their
horizon. Moreover, even if other languages are examined, the value of any logical
inferences from them is much diminished by the custom of our grammarians of
violently fitting them to the Procrustean bed of Aryan grammar.60
Accordingly,  Peirce  in  principle  agrees  with  Reid’s  appeal  to  universal  grammatical
features, if there are any – but no one has made a truly universal survey of languages.
Instead, a half dozen European languages, with perhaps Aramaic or Hebrew as outliers,
have been taken as a sufficient basis for universal claims. I will say more about why these
languages are peculiar, by Peirce’s estimation, below. Peirce, characteristically, sought to
remedy in himself a flaw he saw in the reasoning of others, and did attempt to study
languages  outside  of  the  Indo-European  family,  including  Arabic,  Basque,  Burmese,
Chinese,  Nama,  Ngarrindjeri,  Tagalog,  Thai,  Tibetan,  Sakha,  and Xhosa.61 Nonetheless,
Peirce was well aware of his limitations as a linguist – “I have not the learning requisite
for the subject.”62 In addition to being only an amateur linguist, Peirce recognized that
studying languages from grammar books is insufficient because of the ever-present
Procrustean bed of Latin grammar. That is, even if one were to study a language such as
Xhosa,  our entry into that language is affected both by our native grammar and the
tendency of European grammarians to cut or stretch other languages to fit within Latin
categories. “For that reason, it will not suffice to get one’s idea of an uninflected language
from any mere grammar. It is necessary to have some real, living acquaintance with it, in
order to appreciate its modes of thought, especially since these will be most difficult for
us to grasp.”63 Note again that Peirce suggests an intimate relation between language and
modes of thought, a key point to which I will return in the final section.
24 I  have  claimed  that  Peirce  goes  beyond  Reid’s  concern  with  vocabulary  to  include
grammatical structures, with the common ‘philosophical’ languages being ‘peculiar’ by
Peirce’s  account.  Furthermore,  these peculiarities delegitimize appeals to language in
logic,  and perhaps philosophy more broadly:  “To treat [propositions] just as they are
expressed in  this  or  that  language (as  Hoppe and some others  do)  makes  of  logic  a
philological,  not  a  philosophical,  study.  But  the  canonical  forms  chosen  have  been
suggested  by  the  usage  of  a  narrow  class  of  languages,  and  are  calculated  to  lead
philosophy astray.”64 Thus,  what  makes these languages peculiar?  Peirce consistently
highlights the prevalence of putting subjects in a nominative case. However, he also notes
that  exceptions to this  are readily found even in European languages:  “[…]  although
within that group they would find modes of thought that would somewhat embarrass
them, such as the usage of the Gaelic and Old Irish of putting the subject of a sentence in
the genitive.”65 He continues by asserting that determining “necessities of thought” from
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this  small  group of  European languages  is  “like  judging  of  botanical  possibilities  by
phanerogamous plants.”66 Ignorant of other modes of thought,  those who would base
logic  or  philosophy  upon  language  make  a  necessity  out  of  their  own  peculiar
contingency. What are some consequences of having a strong nominative case? Peirce
remarks upon at least three: first, the belief that a proposition has only one subject, and
second,  the  belief  that  subjects  must  be  nouns.  Regarding  the  first,  Peirce  contends
against the grammarians that a proposition has one predicate, but can have an indefinite
number of subjects.67 Regarding the second, conceiving of subjects as common nouns or
substantive adjectives hides both the essential role of indices in forming propositions,
and the broader nature of indices: “Often, too, the index is not of the nature of a noun. It
may be, as we have seen, a mere look or gesture.”68 Third, Peirce will even go so far as to
point out superfluousness of the copula, as seen by its absence in many other languages.69
These three considerations are fatal to the traditional conception that the essence of a
proposition, and therefore the essence of thought by common supposition, is “S is P” and
its  various concatenations.  Peirce asserts  that  a  desire to find some support  for  this
supposed universal motivates his interest in linguistics:  “The author (though with no
pretension to being a linguist),  has fumbled the grammars of  many languages in the
search for a language constructed at all in the way in which the logicians go out of their
way to teach that all men think.”70 The only candidate he can find is Basque, which has a
minimal number of verbs, but this is only one language that almost meets ‘the logicians’
standard, out of dozens Peirce ‘fumbled,’ and thousands in the world; “[t]his seems to
refute the logicians’ psychology.”71 In short, the grammatical predispositions of European
languages  delayed  the  development  of  both  the  logic  of  relatives  and  a  broader
conception of logic as semeiotic.
25 The peculiarity of European languages is not all negative for Peirce. Indeed, he claims
that  the  development  of  common  nouns  and  abstract  nouns  makes  logical  and
mathematical thinking easier. Unfortunately, he also claims that speakers of language
without common nouns are incapable of triadic thought: “With the exercise of a little
ingenuity  it  is  possible  to  express  anything  in  these  languages,  provided  no  higher
relations  than  dyadic  ones  enter.  Only  very  simple  propositions  can  be  expressed
involving higher relations; and those whose mental education is limited by the powers of
these languages are unable to grasp the meaning of a complex triple relation.”72 This is a
bizarre claim, but one Peirce takes seriously. For example, in his “The Logic of Drawing
History from Ancient Documents,” he offers a speculative biography of Pythagoras as one
of three applications of his method. The details need not concern us here, other than the
novel claim that Pythagoras traveled near the borders of India. This exposure to Indian
thought (and mathematics) influenced Pythagoras’ devotion to numbers, in part because
of a misunderstanding caused by translation from a non-Aryan language into an Aryan
one. Specifically, Peirce suggests the most abstract ideas in this non-Aryan language were
numbers, but this idea became substantivized when put into Greek. “[The Pythagorean
doctrine of numbers] is not mysticism, then, not devotion to chimeras, but an attempt to
interpret an infantile philosophy of some non-Aryan, non-Shemitic thinker.”73 This may
be  improbable,  and  Peirce  himself  offers  it  as  a  mere  hypothesis,  an  example  of
“abduction under difficulties.” Nonetheless, we do not have to agree with Peirce to work
through his ideas, and it is consistent with claims about language and thought he makes
elsewhere.
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26 The  “S  is  P”  structure  of  categorical  logic  was  made  common  sense  by  European
grammars,  which  brings  us  to  a  provocative  question:  What  if  Aristotle  had  been  a
Mexican?74 Here is the context: “When Sayce says that ‘had Aristotle been a Mexican, his
system of logic would have assumed a wholly different form,’ I am willing to admit that
there is a good deal of truth in that. It is lucky that Aristotle’s only language was one that
led him into as few errors as did the Greek.”75 Here Peirce considers linguists who claim
that  logic  must  rest  upon linguistics;  in particular,  Heymann Steinthal  (1823-99)  and
Reverend Archibald Henry Sayce (1845-1933). Peirce quotes volume 2 of Sayce’s 1880 An
Introduction to the Science of Language, which includes gems such as “The philosophy of
speech, in the hands of the Greeks, suffered from the introduction of logic into grammar,
and  revenge  was  taken  by  grounding  logic  upon  the  definitions  of  an  imperfect
grammar.”76 Sayce highlights some of the same imperfections as Peirce, such as “[t]he
division of a sentence into two parts, the subject and the predicate, is a mere accident.”77
Not  only  would Aristotle’s  logic  been wholly  different  if  he  were a  Mexican (in this
context, Sayce probably means a Nahuan, an indigenous Mesoamerican), if he spoke a
language from the Ural-Altaic family he would not have incorrectly analyzed negative
propositions!78 However, Sayce goes too far when he implies that logic should rest upon
even  comparative  philology.  Instead,  Peirce  concludes  that  appeals  to  language  are
“inadequate  and  deceptive  evidence”  of  human  psychology,  and  even  if  we  could
determine human psychology by studying language the results would be “utterly useless
for the investigation of logical questions.”79
 
Conclusion
27 How does this bear upon common sense? As I showed above, Thomas Reid’s Philosophy of
Common Sense rests, in part, on appeals to supposed linguistics universals. In contrast,
Peirce’s Critical Common-sensism must be critical of any such claims. This is one reason
why Peirce’s phenomenology, the first division of philosophy, “[…] contents itself with so
much of experience as pours in upon every man during every hour of his waking life.”80
Furthermore,  it  offers  another  reason  for  re-christening  his  phenomenology  as
phaneroscopy. Hegel’s conception of phenomenology, to which the ethics of terminology
suggests we should defer, runs the risk of articulating the development of Geist along the
logic  of  German prepositions.81 In  contrast,  Peirce’s  phaneroscopy is  a  more  humble
affair,  concerning no more – but also no less – than the cenopythagorean categories.
Philosophy, especially a philosophy of Critical Common Sense, is a cenoscopic science
that rests upon observing daily normal experience, and so while it may “[glance] now and
then” at idioscopic sciences like psychology and linguistics, it cannot be justified by those
sciences.82
28 Perhaps Reid intended his appeals to universal linguistic features as merely indications of
common sense beliefs,  rather than a justification for particular common sense beliefs.
However,  this  is  in  clear  tension  with  his  making  it  one  of  the  primary  sources  of
knowledge regarding the human mind. In addition, it is unclear whether there are any 
linguistic universals.83 Even Peirce’s own example of a vague common sense belief – “fire
burns”  –  utilizes  the  very  subject-predicate  structure  he  sees  as  holding  back  the
development of logic. That is, this simple proposition presupposes an ontology in which
fire is a thing distinct from the action of burning. This grammatically-supported intuition
led to phlogiston, “[t]he most unhappy of physical theories.”84 Fire is not a thing, but
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rather a process. Furthermore, it is doubtful this ‘common sense’ belief could be directly
translated into every other language, for either semantic or syntactic reasons. We are on
sturdier ground with the set of experiences denoted by this proposition, but if our ‘modes
of thought’  are conditioned by our language, as Peirce consistently claims, then ‘our’
interpretation of  this set of experiences may not be the same as those conditioned by
different grammars.85 Again, “fire burns” is vague enough to be indubitable, and yet still
determined by English grammar to mislead as to the nature of propositions.
29 Peirce  is  clear  that  logic,  and  philosophy  in  general,  cannot  rely  upon  linguistics.
However, philosophy must inevitably rely upon language. This paper opens with Peirce’s
claim that “my language is the sum total of myself” and throughout I have emphasized
other claims committing Peirce to some form of linguistic determinism (e.g., the “Sapir-
Whorf hypothesis”).86 Here is  one more:  “A person who has learned to think in beta
graphs has ideas of the utmost clearness and precision which it is practically impossible
to communicate to the mind of a person who has not that advantage.”87 Regardless of how
we answer the question of Peirce’s linguistic determinism, we must reckon with how his
Critical Common-sensism differs from Reid’s Philosophy of Common Sense in not only
coming after Darwin, but also in coming after Humboldt. While we should not pretend to
doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our linguistic hearts, it is unclear how much
common sense is left when we recognize how diverse languages, and therefore thinkers,
are. Of course, this is a call for further inquiry, as diagnosing a problem is only one step in
possibly solving it. I think it also shows that a truly Critical Common-sensism requires a
call for further inquirers, especially from cultures and languages underrepresented, if not
simply ignored,  in philosophy.  Our charitable interest  in an indefinite community of
inquiry should not fail to include people past and present while hoping for those to come.
88
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NOTES
1. See Haack 1994.
2. “For two centuries we have been affixing -ist and -ism to words, in order to note sects which
exalt the importance of those elements which the stemwords signify” (CP 7.565). The earliest use
of “linguisticism” I have found is by R. G. Pote in 1857, but there it refers to phonetic dating. The
earliest use in roughly the sense meant here seems to be (Shurman et al., 1943): “These are the
sophisms  of  our  day:  psychologism,  sociologism,  historicism,  linguisticism  —  pseudo-
philosophies claiming the support  of  science,  itself  the acme of  human wisdom” (208).  Colin
Koopman  uses  ‘linguisticism’  to  mark  Rorty’s  neopragmatism  as  distinct  from  the  focus  on
experience  by  the  ‘primapragmatists’;  e.g.:  “A number  of  pragmatists  have  as  a  result  come
dangerously  near  to  foundationalism  in  relying  on  a  metaphysics  of  experience  to  guard
themselves  against  Rorty’s  linguisticism”  (Koopman  2007:  699;  see  also  Koopman  2011).
Alexander and Koopman use “lingualism,” following Brandom, in a European Journal of Pragmatism
and American Philosophy symposium on “Language or Experience” in American pragmatism (see
Hildebrand 2014). This is an important set of essays concerning some of the questions I raise
here, though I cover much different ground.
3. CP 5.413 [1905]. For more on Peirce’s ethics of terminology, see Haack 2009.
4. CP 5.439 [1905]. Accepting “The Fixation of Belief” (1877) and “How to Make Our Ideas Clear”
(1878) as the first explicit formulation of the pragmatic maxim leads us to expect to find Critical
Common-sensism (though not  by  that  name)  and Scholastic  Realism in  the  1868-9  Journal  of
Speculative Philosophy series. However, if Peirce here refers to his 1871 Berkeley review, or
meetings of the Metaphysical Club around that time, Critical Common-sensism could be found in
the  early  1860s.  Indeed,  some  elements  appear  in  manuscripts  such  as  “A  Treatise  on
Metaphysics”  (W1:57-84,  1861-2)  and  “On  the  Doctrine  of  Immediate  Perception”  (W1:153-5,
1864). Despite this, on Peirce’s own account he defended Scholastic Realism in “Some
Consequences of  Four Incapacities”  (1869)  and the 1871 Berkeley Review “[…] before he had
formulated, even in his own mind, the principle of pragmaticism […]” (CP 5.453 [1905]), so these
earlier manuscripts are likely excluded.
5. CP 5.440 [1905].
6. CP 5.444 [1905].
7. CP 5.445 [1905].
8. CP 5.446 [1905].
9. CP 5.452 [1905]. 
10. CP 5.505 [c. 1905]. Peirce’s imaginary interlocutor, Doctor Y., later adds: “[…] one cannot help
seeing that Criticism and Common-sense are so immiscible that to plunge into either is to lose all
touch with the other” (ibid.). Karl Ameriks has also rejected this supposed immiscibility, though
without  reference  to  Peirce:  “[…]  the  overall  strategy  of  the  Critical  philosophy involves  an
effective  apologist  methodology  remarkably  similar  to  what  is  best  in  Reid’s  commonsense
approach” (Ameriks 2005: 19).
11. CP 5.452 [1905]. In an alternate draft, Peirce makes this point with the claim “Kant (whom I
more than admire) is nothing but a somewhat confused Pragmatist” (CP 5.525 [c. 1905]).
12. I would like to thank Vincent Colapietro for pushing this insight.
13. Kant’s own relation to linguistics and philosophy of language is a complicated affair;  see
Forster 2012 for one survey.
14. W2:153 [1864].
15. W2:278, [1869].
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16. CP 5.444 [1905]. See Sackson 2014 for an excellent summary of views on Reid’s relation to
pragmatism, as well as new arguments for considering Reid as part of the pragmatist tradition.
17. CP 5.512 [c. 1905].
18. Austin (1964: 8).
19. CP 5.513 [c. 1905].
20. See Lundestad 2006. Rysiew 2002 is more critical of the role Providential Naturalism plays in
Reid’s epistemology.
21. “But fallibilism cannot be appreciated in anything like its true significancy until evolution
has been considered” (CP 1.17). However, see Alston 1985 for a defense of fallibilism as one of
Reid’s distinctive contributions to epistemology.
22. CP 5.464
23. EIP I.I, p. 1.
24. IHM VIII.II.
25. EIP II.V.VII, p. 99.
26. IHM II.7, p. 38. 
27. Most  commentators  on  Reid  focus  on  his  defense  of  common  sense  via  an  account  of
sensation, perception, and belief, even when looking beyond his Inquiry;  for example, Magnus
2008. Jacquette 2003 does remark upon Reid’s distinction between artificial signs (language) and
natural signs, but focuses on the latter.
28. EIP I.I.3, p. 6.
29. EIP I.I.4, p. 8.
30. EIP II.IX, p. 169.
31. EIP II.IX, p. 169.
32. EIP II.IX, p. 169.
33. EIP II.IX, p. 170.
34. EIP II.XII.II, p. 209-10.
35. IHM V.7, p. 82.
36. THN 1.4.2: “I dine, I play a game of backgammon, I converse, and am merry with my friends;
and when after  three  or  four  hours’  amusement,  I  wou’d  return to  these  speculations,  they
appear so cold, and strain’d, and ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them any
farther.”
37. EIP I.IV.I.1 & 2, p. 23-4.
38. EIP VI.III.III.7, p. 391-5.
39. EIP I.IV.I.1, p. 24. Here Reid makes a concession similar to Peirce’s third character of Critical
Common-sensism:  “We can  only  expect,  in  the  structure  of  all  languages,  those  distinctions
which  all  mankind  in  the  common  business  of  life  have  occasion  to  make.”  Reid  includes
“business” in one of his definitions of “common sense”: “this is called common sense because it is
common to all men whom we can transact business with, or call to account for their conduct”
(EIP  VI.II,  p. 352).  However,  he  also  suggests  our  “natural  language”  of  facial  expressions,
gestures, and vocal tones suffices for transacting business in the absence of shared “acquired
language.” 
40. EIP VI.III.II, p. 377.
41. See Nöth 2000 for a summary of Peirce’s contributions to linguistics.
42. CP 5.85. See also CP 2.19-20; 2.209; 2.389; 3.432; 5.85-87; 7.175.
43. CP 2.152. Fleshing out Peirce’s opposition to the ‘German logicians’ on this point requires the
details of his general argument against hedonism, as well as the Jamesian equivocation of the true
and the satisfactory. See CP 5.555-5.64, and Ziemkowski 2008.
44. “Psychology must depend in its beginnings upon logic, in order to be psychology and to avoid
being largely logical analysis.  If  then logic is to depend upon psychology in its turn, the two
sciences,  left  without  any  support  whatever,  are  liable  to  roll  in  on  slough  of  error  and
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confusion”  (CP  2.51).  Beverly  Kent  (1987)  remains  essential  for  understanding  Peirce’s
classification(s)  of  the sciences,  but also see Ambrosio 2016 for a more historically-grounded
account.
45. CP 2.39-50.
46. See  Brockhaus  1991  and  Pelletier  et  al. 2008  for  historical  surveys  of  psychologism;
unfortunately, both neglect to include Peirce. See Kasser 1999, Colapietro 2003, and Bellucci 2016
for works specifically on Peirce and psychologism. Colapietro also acknowledges that Peirce’s
anti-psychologism applies to other sciences:  “In sum, Peirce was committed to maintaining a
sharp distinction between the de jure questions characteristic of logical investigation and the de
facto  ones  definitive  of  such  experimental  investigations  as  psychology,  anthropology,  and
linguistics. The grammars reconstructed by linguistics are one thing, the grammar of thought at
the fountainhead of logic quite another.” (2003: 163).
47. The  influence  of  Peirce’s  logic,  conceived  as  semeiotic,  upon  subsequent  linguistics  and
philosophy of language is a separate issue. See Atkin 2008, Pietarinen 2004, and Rellstab 2008,
among others.
48. CP 2.389. See also CP 8.189: “Those whom we may roughly call the German school of logicians
[…] make truth, which is a matter of fact, to be a matter of a way of thinking or even of linguistic
expression.”
49. CP 5.424 Fn P1. One more vocabulary example: Anna Wierzbicka argues against the ‘cultural
anglocentrism’  of  most  English  interpretations  of  Kant:  “Further,  the  essay  shows  how  the
German word Pflicht,  central to Kant’s ethics, does not correspond in meaning to the English
word duty, whose cultural roots lie in English Puritanism” (2015: 141). 
50. CP 7.494; see 6.287 for ‘pirate-lingo.’
51. E.g., “As a philosophical term [presupposition] translates the German Voraussetzung, and is
presumably  prefered  to  ‘postulate’  by  Germans  and  others  imperfectly  acquainted  with  the
English  language,  because  they  suppose  that  postulate  in  English  has  the  same  meaning  as
Postulat in German, which is not true; for the English retains the old meaning, while the German
has generally adopted the conception of Wolff” (CP 3.635).
52. CP 5.611. 
53. CP 2.220.
54. “[…] if it is meant that True and Satisfactory are synonyms, it strikes me that it not so much a
doctrine of philosophy as it is a new contribution to English lexicography” (CP 5.555).
55. EIP II.V.VII, p. 1oo. Again, compare CP 7.494.
56. CP 2.280. This neglects signed languages, though Peirce acknowledges their existence at least
once: “This seventh Genus [linguistics] is stupendous, embracing not only Speech, but all modes
of communication, such as Sign Language, and under speech studying all dialects, not merely in




60. CP 2.211. Peirce quotes Volume 1 of Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik (1890) by his friend
the logician Friedrich Wilhelm Karl Ernst Schröder (1841-1902).
61. I derived this list from MS 427 [c. 1902], though I have updated Peirce’s terminology. Here are
his original terms, in the order above: Arabic, Basque, Burmese, Chinese, Hottentot, “Adelaide
language,” Tagala, Siamese, Thibetan, Yakut, and Kaffir. My identification of Peirce’s “Adelaide
language” rests upon geography, but also the publication of a Ngarrindjeri Bible by Reverend
George Taplin (1831-79) in 1864. Earlier in this manuscript Peirce claims his knowledge of ‘Kaffir’
came  from  studying  a  translated  Bible  (slide  891),  which  suggests  a  similar  source  for  his
exposure to Ngarrindjeri.  I  must note that the names ‘Hottentot’  and ‘Kaffir,’  though largely
neutral  anthropological  terms in Peirce’s  day,  were imposed by colonizers,  and became even
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more intense racial  slurs  under Apartheid.  Indeed,  both are considered hate speech in post-
Apartheid South Africa. This portion of manuscript, while one of the most detailed sources of
evidence for Peirce’s study of comparative linguistics, is unpublished in the Collected Papers. This
is  so  perhaps  because  it  begins  with  the  question  of  whether  the  White  race  originated
independently or was “a mongrel composed of black and yellow” (slide 883). Here is the editorial
note: “We omit a long section on linguistics and anthropology” (CP 7.385 Fn 22). 
62. MS 427 slide 909.
63. CP 2.69. In a footnote to CP 4.48 Peirce notes the time he spent with Edward Henry Palmer
(1840-82), an English explorer fluent in Arabic – fluent enough to resist the siren call of Latin
grammar:  “It  gave  me  great  pleasure  after  [Palmer’s]  death  to  find  a  super-learned  Regius
Professor find fault with Palmer’s Arabic grammar because it followed the system which seemed
right to those whose vernacular Arabic was, instead of ‘following the Greek and Latin methods’.”
Peirce offers at least one more specification of what having a “real, living acquaintance” with a
language requires: “But one has not mastered a language as long as one has to think about it in
another language. One must learn to think in it about facts.” (CP 4.475).
64. CP 2.338. This appears to be Janus Hoppe (unknown dates), who published Die Gesammte Logik
(in two parts) in 1868, and Die Kleine Logik in 1869. It is not clear which of these Peirce read, as he
only cites “Hoppe, Logik §§256, 257” (CP 6.627). However, Die Kleine Logik ends with §254. See CP
2.400 Fn P2 for Peirce’s other brief mention of Hoppe.
65. CP 2.68. See also CP 2.338, 4.438 Fn P1, and 8.242. Old Irish did have a nominative case, though
this might be a case of the Procrustean Bed. However, Modern Irish does not have a nominative,
with a ‘common case’ taking the role of both nominative and accusative.
66. CP 2.68; ‘phaneragamous’ is an old name for spermatophytes, or seed plants. Under current
classifications, seed plants compose some 90% of the 300,000 species in Kingdom Plantae, but in
Peirce’s time ‘plant’ include algae (tens of thousands of species) and fungi (millions of species). At
CP 4.48 he makes a similar claim, and also compares the Indo-European languages to languages in
general as “the vertebrates to all animals” With current numbers, that would mean limiting what
“animal” meant to 66,000 species while ignoring over a million invertebrate species.  Specific
numbers aside, Peirce’s point is clear.
67. “But from a logical point of view the terminology of the older grammarians was better, who
spoke of the subject nominative and the subject accusative. I do not know that they spoke of the
subject dative; but in the proposition, ‘Anthony gave a ring to Cleopatra,’ Cleopatra is as much a
subject of what is meant and expressed as is the ring or Anthony. A proposition, then, has one
predicate  and  any  number  of  subjects.”  (CP  5.542).  In  other  words,  grammar  inclines  us  to
conceive the subject as both an agent (what “does the verb”), and primary (typically comes first,
and also the “most important”). In contrast, logically the predicate is primary, and ascribes a
relationship to subjects. It is probably no accident that Peirce uses the verb ‘give’ here, as it is his
consistent example of a genuine triadic relation: “The word gives refers to the same sort of fact
[as donation], but its meaning is such that that meaning is felt to be incomplete unless those
items are, at least formally, specified; as they are in ‘Somebody gives something to some person
(real or artificial)’.” (CP 4.543; see also CP 1.345, 1.371, 1.474, 1.520, 2.86, 3.424, 3.464, 4.438 Fn P1,
5.89, 5.469, 6.323, 8.331). “Anthony gives” is grammatically fine, but is logically incomplete, at
best, without the “what” given and the “whom” receiving. 
68. CP 2.338.
69. “In the Old Egyptian language, which seems to come within earshot of the origin of speech,
the most explicit expression of the copula is by means of a word, really the relative pronoun,
which. Now to one who regards a sentence from the Indo-European point of view, it is a puzzle
how ‘which’ can possibly serve the purpose in place of ‘is.’ Yet nothing is more natural.” (CP 4.49 ;
original emphasis). See also CP 2.319, 2.328. 2.354, 4.41. See Kammerzell et al. 2016 for a thorough
review and critique of Peirce’s study of Ancient Egypt in light of current science.
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72. CP 7.385 Fn 22.
73. MS 690: 160-1.
74. Though perhaps not so common, as seen in the need to explicitly teach undergraduates how
to translate ordinary language into categorical forms.
75. CP 2.69.
76. ISL 327.
77. ISL 328-9. Sayce identifies Hegel as one who also made this criticism: “Hegel long ago pointed
out that the analysis [of the proposition] was an empirical one dependent upon the observation
of  the  individual  thinker,  and  the  criticism  of  Hegel  is  supplemented  by  the  teaching  of
comparative philology” (328).
78. ISL 329-30. This is because languages in the Ural-Altaic family have negative conjugations.
79. CP 2.70.
80. CP 5.13 Fn P1. Peirce does not doubt the universality of this experience: “If you ask present
when,  and  to  whose  mind,  I  reply  that  I  leave  these  questions  unanswered,  never  having
entertained a  doubt  that  those  features  of  the  phaneron that  I  have  found in  my mind are
present at all times and to all minds” (CP 1.284). We critical common-sensists might be critical of
this claim, but neurodiversity is a topic for another paper.
81. Friedrich Christoph Oetinger (1702-82) coined the term Phänomenologie, but Hegel’s use is the
most  prominent  before  Husserl  adopted  the  term.  Peirce’s  relationship  with  Hegel  is
characteristically complex: “I reject his philosophy in toto” (CP 1.368), but also “Hegel, in some
respects the greatest philosopher that ever lived […]” (CP 1.524). See also Rockmore 1999, Stern
2005, Stern 2007.
82. “If philosophy glances now and then at the results of special sciences, it is only as a sort of
condiment to excite its own proper observation” (CP 1.241).
83. Joseph  Greenberg  (1915-2001)  offers  a  list  of  45  universals,  but  nearly  all  of  these  are
implicative (if a language has feature X, then it has feature Y), with the most clearly absolute being
“All languages have pronominal categories involving at least three persons and two numbers”
(Greenberg 1963: 108). However, this list comes from comparing only 30 languages. Tullio Viola
explores Peirce’s early interest in the English personal pronouns I, It, and Thou. In particular,
Viola’s study complements my own by bringing Peirce into dialogue with a tradition originating
with Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835). “I would like to argue here that Peirce’s affinities with
Humboldt, as well as the possible direct links with his work, can be taken as the starting point for
an inquiry into the broader relationship between Peirce and that tradition of studies on personal
pronouns as universals of language” (Viola 2011: 398).
84. CP 2.150.
85. As a consequence, Peirce’s speculative grammar must be truly speculative: “This will amount
to what Duns Scotus called speculative grammar. For it must analyse an assertion into its essential
elements,  independently  of  the  structure  of  the  language  in  which  it  may happen  to  be
expressed.” (CP 3.430). See also CP 4.438 Fn P1.
86. CP 5.314. See also CP 2.220, 2.69, CP 7.385 Fn 22, MS 690: 160-161. “Sapir-Whorf hypothesis” is
a  misnomer,  as  Edward  Sapir  (1884-1939)  and  Benjamin  Lee  Whorf  (1897-1941)  never  co-
authored. Again, for understanding Peirce the most salient proponent of linguistic determinism,
or linguistic relativity, is Humboldt. For more specifically on “man” as a language or sign, see
Burks 1980, Colapietro 1988, and Fairbanks 1976.
87. CP 4.150.
88. CP 2.655.
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ABSTRACTS
A  variety  of  commentators  have  explored  the  similarities  between  pragmatism  and  Thomas
Reid’s  Philosophy of  Common Sense.  Peirce  himself  claims his  version of  pragmatism either
(loosely) is, or entails, a Critical Common-sensism, a blend of what is best in Kant and Reid. In
this paper I argue for a neglected aspect of the relation between Peirce and Reid, and of each to
common sense: linguistics. First, I summarize Peirce’s account of what distinguishes his common-
sensism from Reid’s. Second, I argue for the importance of appeals to linguistic universals by
Reid as both a source for identifying common sense beliefs, and a basis for justifying them. While
Peirce  is  occasionally  tempted by such appeals,  overall  he  is  critical  of  appeals  to  language,
especially as most Western philosophers have been familiar with a small set of (Indo-)European
languages; say, English, French, German, Greek, Italian, and Latin. This leads to the third section,
which concerns Peirce’s familiarity with major nineteenth century linguists, and his contention
that the ‘peculiarity’ of Western European languages has impeded the development of logic and
philosophy. In particular, I look at unpublished manuscripts where Peirce summarizes his own
study of non-European languages,  ranging from Arabic,  to Ngarrindjeri,  to Xhosa. Peirce was
only an amateur linguist,  and also aware of the challenges of doing cross-cultural  linguistics
through  comparative  grammar;  e.g.,  the  temptation  to  force  unfamiliar  languages  onto  the
“Procrustean Bed of Aryan grammar” (CP 2.211). Nonetheless, this study left him suspicious of
any claims of linguistic universals, and supported his anti-psychologism. That is, not only should
logic and philosophy not be based upon psychology (at least as a special science), they should
also be independent of linguistics. However, Peirce also advances something like the so-called
Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, that language determines, or at least conditions, thought. The question
now becomes what is the nature of a philosophy of common sense, even a critical one, without a
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